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This paper analyses the incentives to participate in an international climate agreement and the stability
of the resulting climate coalition using the integrated assessment model WITCH. Coalition stability is
assessed under alternative assumptions concerning the pure rate of time preference, the aggregation of
social welfare, and the severity of climate damages. The proﬁtability, stability, and strong potential
internal stability of a number of coalitions, those potentially effective in reducing GHG emissions, is
explored in the paper. The main conclusion is that only the grand coalition, i.e. a coalition where all
world regions cooperate to reduce emissions, can maintain GHG concentration below 550 ppm CO2-eq.
However, this coalition is not internally stable, even when allowing for monetary transfers across
world regions. Nonetheless, the paper also shows that strongly potentially internally stable coalitions
exist, though of smaller size, which can mitigate global warming and limit GHG concentrations to
600 ppm CO2-eq.
& 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The global public good nature of climate change control
requires cooperation among a large set of emitters for GHG
emissions to be effectively reduced. When dealing with interna-
tional climate agreements, this implies that the climate coalition
can be effective only if the major economies, or at least the largest
GHG producing regions, participate in the agreement. The events
characterising international climate negotiations of the past 20ll rights reserved.
is being carried out by the
amme of the FondazioneEni
for its ﬁnancial support. In
extremely useful comments.
aggiore, 30124 Venice, Italy.
).years show the difﬁculty of achieving a large consensus on
collaborative actions to control climate change. This is not
surprising, given the free-riding incentives usually undermining
global public good provision.
The theoretical literature on environmental coalitions often
stresses that stable coalitions are generally small and might fail to
effectively address environmental problems, especially in the case
of climate change control (Cf. Barrett, 1994; Carraro and
Siniscalco, 1993; Asheim et al., 2006; Bre´chet et al., 2011). When
the recipients of beneﬁts are not the same of those bearing the
costs and the beneﬁts of emissions reductions cannot be appro-
priated exclusively by those countries paying for the costs, as in
the case of GHG emission reduction, a stable agreement can
hardly be achieved, thus reﬂecting the difﬁculty to provide
sufﬁcient participation incentives to widely heterogeneous coun-
tries. Only when the beneﬁts from cooperation are small, can a
stable coalition succeed at sustaining a large number of signa-
tories (Cf. Barrett, 1994). However, in this case, the climate
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reductions.
Despite the slow progresses in global climate policy making,
the Durban Action Platform for Enhanced Action, put in place at
the end of 2011, has renewed the interest in the assessment of the
effectiveness and long-term sustainability of climate coalitions.
A successful international climate policy framework should build
a coalition of countries with the potential to (i) effectively reduce
global GHG emissions; and (ii) to give each of its members
sufﬁcient incentives to join and remain in the coalition. Such
coalition should be able to meet the required stabilisation target
without inducing excessively high mitigation costs and should
deliver a net beneﬁt to member countries as a whole.
In order to keep the problem tractable, coalition theory has
often made various simplifying assumptions. Some of these
assumptions – such as the symmetry of players and the presence
of a single externality – represent a major limitations of the
analysis undertaken thus far. In this paper, we try to ﬁll this gap
by assuming multiple externalities, asymmetric countries and a
realistic description of the world economy. Coalition efﬁciency
and stability is then analysed using a numerical approach based
on WITCH, a global integrated model of economic and climate
systems (see Bosetti et al., 2006 for a detailed description of the
model).
To our knowledge, only a few studies have already used a
similar approach to assess climate coalitions. Bosello et al. (2003)
studies the effects of different equity rules on the incentives to
cooperate using the dynamic integrated climate model FEEM-
RICE. Carraro et al. (2006) uses the stylized integrated assessment
simulation model ClimNeg World Simulator to show how appro-
priate monetary transfers may induce almost all countries to sign
a stable climate treaty. Using the same model ClimNeg World,
Bre´chet et al. (2011) compares different stability concepts and
Bre´chet et al. (2010) analyses the negotiation strategy of the
European Union, evaluating the incentives of key players to join
future climate agreements. Nagashima et al. (2009) uses the
STACO model to analyse different transfer schemes and their
impact on participation incentives, global welfare and abatement
efforts. However, the STACO model does not explicitly model the
linkages between economic, energy, and climatic variables, but
rather relies on reduced-form cost and beneﬁt functions. The
ClimNeg World Simulation model used by Bre´chet et al. (2011),
Carraro et al. (2006) and Chander and Tulkens (1997), as well as
the FEEM-RICE model used by Bosello et al. (2003), are a step
ahead as they encompass the economic, climatic, and energy
dimensions.
The modelling framework used in this paper represents a
further improvement over the just mentioned models. The WITCH
model has two major strengths with respect to other models.
First, it explicitly incorporates the gains from emission reductions
in terms of avoided climate change through a set of regional
damage functions that feed climate change back into the econ-
omy. Second, the equilibrium is computed as the solution of a
game. The 12 model regions and/or coalitions of regions behave
strategically with respect to all major economic decision vari-
ables, including emission abatement levels, by playing a non-
cooperative Nash game. Therefore, when deciding whether or not
to cooperate on GHG emission control, countries take into
account how their decisions affect all other countries, and
whether these countries will cooperate or remain outside the
climate coalition. Mitigation options are fully modelled as invest-
ment choices in alternative energy technologies, abatement in
non-CO2 gases, and changes in deforestation patterns. Moreover,
technological change in energy efﬁciency and clean technologies
is endogenous and reacts to price and policy signals. Technological
innovation and diffusion processes are also subject to internationalspillovers. This implies that the model accounts for multiple
externalities, which can be partly internalised when a coalition is
formed.
This paper builds on the previous work of Bosetti et al. (2009),
where the potential environmental effectiveness of all 4069
coalitions that would result from the 12 regions composing the
Witch model was assessed. In particular, all coalitions that could
deliver the stabilisation targets commonly discussed in the policy
arena were identiﬁed. In the present paper, we take stock of our
previous work and, within the set of all possible climate coali-
tions, we focus on those that have the potential to meet an
ambitious enough global mitigation target. These are coalitions
whose global emission path would be consistent with long-run
stabilisation of global GHG concentration at 550 ppm CO2-eq,
despite the Business-as-Usual (BaU) emission pathway of non-
participating regions. For this subset of coalitions, we evaluate
whether the welfare of each participating country is larger than
the welfare it would obtain from withdrawing from the coalition,
thus free-riding on other participants’ abatement efforts (internal
stability). We also check whether there are international mone-
tary transfers that can compensate for the free-riding incentives
(potential internal stability).
Given the uncertainties involved in predicting and valuing the
future damages and risks from climate change, the analysis is
performed under four alternative combinations of damage and
discount rate assumptions. A low-damage case is based on the
damage assessment in Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), while a high-
damage case incorporates the more recent, upward revisions
made for instance by Hanemann (2008) and Stern (2007).
A low-discounting case assumes a (pure) utility discount rate of
0.1%, in line with Stern (2007), while a high-discounting case
assumes the 3% value used in Nordhaus (2007). Finally, we assess
the effect of different weighting in the aggregation of regions’
welfare and the effect this has on our main ﬁndings.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes WITCH’s
game-theoretic framework. Section 3 assesses the basic individual
incentives for countries to participate in a climate coalition.
Section 4 brings together the incentive effects associated with
different damages and abatement costs to analyse coalition
formation and stability. In particular, we determine under what
conditions a subset of world regions ﬁnd it proﬁtable to sign an
international climate agreement (i.e. to join a climate coalition)
and whether the resulting coalition is effective and stable (robust
to free-riding incentives). In the concluding section, the policy
implications of our analysis are discussed.2. The game theoretic structure of WITCH
Let us start by considering a simpliﬁed setting in which
countries (players) bargain over the provision of a global public
good, namely the control of GHG emissions. On the one hand,
reducing GHG emissions is costly because new technologies have
to be developed and adopted to replace fossil fuel consumption.
On the other hand, lower emissions reduce concentrations and
the associated negative economic impacts of climate change.
The difﬁculty of providing a global public good can be studied
using a simple game theoretic set up based on John Nash’s early
contributions. Using this approach, interactions among countries
are modelled as a one-shot simultaneous game and lead either to
full cooperation or to free-riding. If the beneﬁts from an higher
provision of the global public good are widely dispersed in space
and in time and costs are instead high and private as in the case of
climate change control, free-riding inevitably prevails and the
global common resource is spoiled, leading to the well-known
‘‘tragedy of the commons’’.
2 Electricity can be generated using fossil-fuel-based technologies and carbon-
free options. Fossil-fuel-based technologies include natural gas combined cycle
(NGCC), oil- and pulverised coal-based power plants. Integrated gasiﬁcation
combined cycle power plants equipped with carbon capture and storage (CCS)
are also modelled. Zero carbon technologies include hydroelectric and nuclear
power plants, wind turbines and photovoltaic panels. The end-use sector uses
traditional biomass, biofuels, coal, gas, and oil. Together, oil and gas account for
more than 70% of energy consumption in the non-electric sector. Instead, the use
of coal and traditional biomass is limited to some developing regions and
decreases over time. First generation biofuels consumption is currently low in
all regions of the world and the overall penetration remains modest over time
given the conservative assumptions on their large-scale deployment.
3 The base year availability of fossil fuel resources for 2005 is calibrated on IEA
(2004). The consequences of recent shale gas discoveries are captured by allowing
V. Bosetti et al. / Energy Policy 55 (2013) 44–5646However, the strategic interactions outlined above (also
named Prisoner’s Dilemma) are quite crude and do not corre-
spond to the observed behaviour of countries facing global
externalities. Indeed, international cooperation often does exist,
albeit at different degrees, on a wide range of issues of common
interest. In particular, over the last decades, the emergence of
several international treaties to protect global common goods has
been observed. How can those treaties come into force when
individual countries would beneﬁt from overgrazing the common
resource? How is it possible to account for the fact that in the real
world countries continuously interact, that they learn from each
other’s past actions, or that they can commit and design mechan-
isms to enhance cooperation and deter non-compliance with
international norms?
These issues are at the core of the recent developments of
coalition theory. Let us consider the simplest case of a simulta-
neous one-shot game. This game can be ideally decomposed into
two stages. In the ﬁrst step – the coalition game – countries
decide whether or not to cooperate. In the second step – the
policy game – countries choose the optimal level of carbon
emissions. The decision in the ﬁrst step is inﬂuenced by several
factors, including what countries perceive to be the optimal
strategy of all other countries in the second step of the game.
In this game setting, Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) showed
that partial cooperation (i.e. only a subset of negotiating countries
join the coalition) is fully rational and can emerge as the
equilibrium outcome of the non-cooperative game. They show
that the bargaining process may lead to different degrees of
cooperation. Full cooperation is achieved when all countries form
a coalition to control global emissions, thus fully internalising
global damages from climate change. Partial cooperation emerges
when only a subset of countries cooperate to control emissions,
whereas the remaining countries free-ride. The fully non-
cooperative case is yet another possible equilibrium of the game,
where each country controls emissions taking into account only
its own costs and beneﬁts from GHG emissions, thus neglecting
climate damages affecting the other countries.
Non-cooperative coalition theory has shown that countries can
endogenously form coalitions of different sizes. In addition, the
conditions for a coalition to form and not to break up in sufﬁcient
stages of the game (coalition stability) have been explored.
Signiﬁcant effort has also been devoted to studying mechanisms
that can foster coalition formation and stability, among which
transfers and issue linkage are the most prominent ones.
In this paper, we build on this literature and explore the
stability and size of a set of effective coalitions. Instead of using a
stylised description of regional costs and beneﬁts, we use a
detailed integrated assessment model, which allows us to con-
sider a set of realistic features, such as heterogeneous players,
technological change, and the interplay with natural resources.
The numerical analysis of climate coalition is performed with
the WITCH model,1 an energy-economy model that incorporates a
detailed representation of the energy sector into an intertemporal
growth model of the global economy disaggregated into 12
regions. The emphasis on the energy sector and GHG mitigation
options allows technology-related issues to be studied within a
general equilibrium framework characterised by environmental
(expected future climate change damages), economic (exhaustible
natural resources), and technology (knowledge and experience
spillovers) externalities (Cf. Bosetti et al., 2006, 2008). As in a
Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model, the central planner of each region
maximises intertemporal welfare by optimally choosing investments
in a general ﬁnal-good sector, in power generation technologies, in1 See www.witchmodel.org for model description and related papers.R&D, and the expenditure in ﬁnal energy consumption, given a
production function for the ﬁnal good, a budget constraint and
kinetic equations for capital accumulation.
The WITCH model can be used to simulate all degrees of
cooperation among the 12 macro-regions in which world coun-
tries are aggregated. The model can run in a cooperative mode
where global social welfare is maximised. In this case, coopera-
tion internalises all environmental and economic externalities.
The model can also be used to compute a decentralised or non-
cooperative solution, where each individual region optimises
welfare taking as given the other regions’ choice. In between
these two extremes it is possible to model and analyse all possible
combinations of partial coalitions.
It must also be noted that a great deal of cooperation is
assumed anyway, because world countries are aggregated into
12 regional blocks that behave as a single negotiating entity. This
might be a valid assumption for the European Union and regions
that match with a single country (USA and China), but it might be
overly optimistic for large regions such as Latin America and
South-East Asia.
The climate scenarios obtained from the WITCH model are
thus the outcome of a game in which world regions interact in a
setting of strategic interdependence. Each region’s social planner
is a player of the game. The action of each player consists in
choosing the investment paths of various energy technologies for
power generation, of dedicated energy R&D, and of fuel consump-
tion. Fuels (crude oil, natural gas, coal, and uranium) are needed
to feed traditional power plants and to satisfy ﬁnal consumption
in the end use sector.2 Fuel externalities are driven by the fact
that the international prices of oil, gas, coal, and uranium are
determined by the equilibrium between global demand and
supply and the accounting of resources exhaustibility.3 Interna-
tional prices endogenously reﬂect the availability of fuel
resources, which is ultimately driven by global consumption. Fuel
prices increase with global demand to reﬂect resource scarcity,
similar to Nordhaus and Boyer (2000). For a description of the
equations see Bosetti et al. (2006) and Bosetti et al. (2007). A set
of reduced-form cost functions accounts for the non-linear effect
of both depletion and extraction. Assuming competitive markets,
the domestic fuel price is equal to the marginal cost and depends
on the total cumulative quantity of fuels extracted. Therefore,
even though fuel trade is not modelled, consumption in a region
affects consumption and production in other regions, although
each region is oblivious of its own effect on fuel prices.
The cost of some low-carbon mitigation options is also
endogenous and reﬂects the effects of innovation and Learning-
By-Doing. International innovation externalities occur because
technology costs are affected by the global stock of knowledge
available at a given point in time, as well as the global stocka fast growth of reserves between 2005 and 2025. Our cost function translates this
into a decline of prices during 2005–2025. More recent assessments of global shale
gas reserves and their long-term impact on gas prices have not been included in
this analysis.
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that the knowledge in richer countries represents the technology
frontier and that each region can use part of this knowledge
provided they possess a sufﬁciently high absorptive capacity. A
region’s absorptive capacity is also endogenously modelled and
depends on R&D investments in the region. Therefore, knowledge
spillovers are not a free good, since they require dedicated
investments. In contrast, spillovers of experience are completely
free, as they do not require domestic investments in order to
affect technology costs. It should be mentioned that the model
captures technology market failures only in the energy sector, as
no general purpose R&D is assumed in this version. In addition, no
learning is considered for known, yet potentially improvable
technologies, such as nuclear power and carbon capture and
storage.
The choice of the energy and fuel mix determines regional
GHG emissions. The accumulation of GHG emissions in the
atmosphere and the effects on global mean temperature are
governed by a reduced form climate module. A climate change
damage function identiﬁes the climate feedback on the economy.
This feedback is measured in terms of GDP losses. In this setting, a
cost-beneﬁt analysis can be performed. Regions choose their
optimal investments trading off the costs and the beneﬁts of
their decisions, where costs and beneﬁts account for environ-
mental impacts and their feedbacks on the economy.
Since world regions are quite different, both in their climate
damages and abatement costs, coalitions are characterised not
only by their size but also by their composition. The set of
coalitions G is therefore composed of 4095 possible combinations
among the 12 regions, including the grand coalition gGC, which
comprises all players. When formed, coalitions become players of
the game. Regions that do not join a coalition are said to behave
as singletons or as free-riders.
The outcome of the game, for each region or group of regions,
is a consumption path over the whole simulation horizon.
Regions’ social planners, indexed by i¼1,y,12, express their
preferences over the outcomes of the game using a logarithmic
utility function which evaluates per capita consumption. If t
denotes time, ci,t is per capita consumption in region i at time t,
Li,t denotes population and g denotes a coalition in the set of all
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When a coalition is formed, it acts as a player and chooses
actions to maximise the joint welfare of its members. Unfortu-
nately, the joint welfare of the coalition cannot be deﬁned as the
sum of the coalition members’ utility, as in many theoretical and
empirical papers that work with linear or quasi-linear prefer-
ences. The choice to characterise preferences by means of a twice
continuously differentiable utility function requires the use of a
social welfare aggregator, which assigns a social preference to
every possible proﬁle of individual preferences. It is indeed
important to recall that utility functions can be used to assess if
a given consumption level is preferred or not with respect to an
alternative consumption level but should not be used to evaluate
by how much one consumption level is preferred to the other.
Utility is not a cardinal property. This implies that utility cannot
be summed across players.In WITCH we use the following social welfare aggregator S:
SðgÞ ¼ SðW1 g
 
,W2ðgÞ,. . .,WnðgÞÞ ¼
Xn
i ¼ 1 Stoi,tLi,tlnðci,tðgÞÞDt , ð2Þ
where oi,t are weights that are used to aggregate regions.
Weights, as the discount rate, can be chosen on either normative
or positive consideration. We consider weights equal to the
inverse of marginal utility and weights proportional to the
population share and study how they affect coalition formation
and other results.
The ﬁrst set of weightsoi,t that we consider equalises marginal
utility of consumption across all coalition members in any time
period. The weights ‘‘linearize’’ the utility functions. Therefore the
social welfare aggregation rule neutralizes differences in marginal
utility due to differences on consumption level across coalition
members and avoids wealth transfers from wealthy players to
poor players and from the future to the present. Abatement effort
is distributed with the sole objective of minimising coalition’s
emission reduction costs, which is equivalent to equalise mar-
ginal abatement costs across regions.
The second set of weights that we consider attributes more
importance to regions with higher population. With WITCH
regional aggregation this implies higher weight on developing
countries. According to our deﬁnition of regional impact functions
developing countries suffer higher negative impacts from global
warming. We thus expect that this weighting scheme would yield
coalitions that to do more to reduce GHG emissions.
To compute the optimal investment paths for all climate
coalitions, we assume a non-cooperative, simultaneous, open
membership, Nash game with non-orthogonal free-riding, and
we allow for the possibility of international monetary transfers to
sustain and possibly enlarge climate coalitions. Using our game-
theoretic framework and the WITCH model it is also possible to
simulate issue linkage to increase the proﬁtability and stability of
coalitions by allowing regions to cooperate on other externalities,
e.g. on knowledge spillovers.
The model is solved as a one-shot two stage game. In the ﬁrst
stage, players decide on their participation and a coalition may be
formed. In the second stage, coalition members choose their
optimal emission levels by internalising the environmental extern-
ality only. The other players maximise their own welfare functions
taking into account the coalition’s and the remaining players’
decisions. The game is then solved backward. The equilibrium is
found by employing the g-characteristic function approach
(Chander and Tulkens, 1997): in the unique Nash equilibrium,
coalition members jointly play their best response to non-coalition
members, who individually adopt their best-reply strategies.
The game exhibits positive spillovers. When a new member
joins the coalition, countries outside the coalition are better off
because they beneﬁt from: (1) a better environment, (2) technology
spillovers (knowledge is not a club good) and (3) lower fuel prices.
Let us now introduce some crucial deﬁnitions that are later
used in the paper to study coalition formation. In order to exist,
coalitions must be both proﬁtable and stable (d’Aspremont et al.,
1983; d’Aspremont and Gabszewicz, 1986; Donsimoni et al.,
1986; Carraro and Siniscalco, 1991). A coalition gAG is said to
be proﬁtable if coalition members have a higher welfare than in a
scenario where the coalition is not formed (Nash equilibrium),
WiðgÞZWiNash 8iAg. Where Wi(g) is the welfare of player i that
belongs to coalition g, and WiNash is the welfare of player i in the
fully non-cooperative Nash equilibrium.
This is a necessary, but not sufﬁcient condition for the
coalition to be formed. A second requirement concerns stability.
A coalition g is said to be stable if it is internally and externally
stable. A coalition is internally stable if signatory countries do not
have the incentive to defect and to behave non-cooperatively
V. Bosetti et al. / Energy Policy 55 (2013) 44–5648when other coalition members cooperate, i.e. 8iAg; Wi(g)Z
Wi(g\i), where Wi(g\i) denotes the welfare of player i when all
members but i are cooperating. A coalition is externally stable if
there is no incentive to enlarge the coalition by including non-
signatory countries: 8ieg; Wi(g)ZWi(g[{i}).
Finally, let us consider how transfers within the coalition can
affect stability. We start by deﬁning the set of all self-ﬁnanced
transfers M as follows:










The region’s i interest rate4 ri,t declines over time and the

























Thus, a coalition is PIS if the discounted sum of log utility of
per capita consumption with transfers is at least as big as the
discounted sum of log utility of per capita consumption when
each region behaves as free-rider. The subset of all self-ﬁnanced
transfer schemes for which a coalition is PIS is deﬁned as follows:
M^¼ m^¼ m^1,t ,:::,m^n,t
 
9m^M and Wi g,m^
 
ZWi g\i
  8iAg , ð5Þ
Among all transfer schemes that belong to M^, we focus on the
subset ~M M for which each coalition member enjoys a level of
discounted consumption with transfer sat least as large as when
free-riding:
~M ¼ ~m ¼ ~m1,t ,. . ., ~mn,t
 
















In Eq. (6) we use region- and time-speciﬁc interest rates
because we are discounting wealth and not utility, as opposed
to Eq. (4). Coalition members can optimally distribute transfers
intertemporally at the country-speciﬁc interest rate. If we deﬁne
with Wi,t the change of consumption of coalition member i at time
t induced by the transfer, the following condition must hold to






Members that expect to receive payments in the future can
reduce investment in the present to compensate for the loss of
productivity due to climate policy, and vice-versa.
Finally, we show that the transfer scheme ~M belongs to the set
of transfers that make a coalition PIS. Eqs. (6) and (7) imply that in
each time period all coalition members can afford a consumption
level at least as high as when free-riding:
~M ¼ ~m ¼ ~m1,t ,:::, ~mn,t
 












ð8Þ4 In a Ramsey-type optimal growth model the interest rate is endogenous and
equal to the marginal product of capital. Thus, it depends on the level of development
of each region. Regions with low capital accumulation tend to have higher interest
rates than those with higher capital accumulation. The interest rate is always higher
than the rate of pure time preference, but the differences diminish with capital
accumulation, as in a standard Ramsey-type optimal growth framework.
We compute the interest rate ex-post, as follows:
















i,tTherefore, with transfers, coalition members can (at least)
preserve the same welfare level of free-riding. This leads to the
following deﬁnition: a coalition is strongly PIS if ~Ma|. Being
strongly PIS is a sufﬁcient but not necessary condition to be a PIS
coalition.
One ﬁnal caveat concerns the working assumption that the
interest rate does not vary with readjustments of consumption
levels ﬁnanced by transfers. If the change in the distribution of
consumption is small, the impact on the rate of return to
investments will also be small and the interest rate can be
assumed to be ﬁxed with little loss of precision. Our numerical
exercises show the loss of accuracy is minimal, because transfers
are typically small compared to GDP.3. Assessing the drivers of participation in international
climate coalitions
The incentives for main emitting countries to participate in
climate coalitions ultimately depend on a wide range of economic
and political factors, not all of which can be captured by model-
based exercises. Bearing this caveat in mind, the analysis carried
out in this paper covers the major economic drivers of participa-
tion incentives, including the expected impacts of climate change,
the inﬂuence of distant impacts on current policy decisions (i.e.
the discount rate), and the costs of mitigation policies. This
Section describes how each of these three drivers are captured
in the WITCH model, and how participation incentives vary across
the main world regions.3.1. Climate change impacts in WITCH
Adequate knowledge of climate change impacts is a prerequi-
site for well-informed climate change mitigation policies. Alter-
native assumptions regarding such impacts can lead to
profoundly different policy insights, in terms of the outcome of
cost-beneﬁt analyses and the incentives for individual regions to
participate in climate coalitions.
Estimating the economic impacts of climate change raises a
number of difﬁcult issues. First, the knowledge on the physical
impacts of climate is limited, especially in relation to non-market
areas or impacts. Second, assigning monetary values to climate
change damages is particularly challenging. Third, the need to
identify the global cost-beneﬁt optimal emission level requires
deﬁning an indicator of the global beneﬁts of emission reduction
in terms of avoided damages. Therefore, impacts have to be
aggregated across sectors and across regions, which raises equity
issues, and over time, which raises intergenerational issues.
Surveying the literature on the impacts of climate change, it is
immediately clear that damage estimates vary widely and uncer-
tainty in the size of economic impact affects mostly non-market
areas (Tol, 2005; Jamet and Corfee-Morlot, 2009).5 Non-market
impacts are either not considered or underestimated. Most IAMs
are indeed based on out-of-date evidence, and most regional
estimates are extrapolations from studies that have been carried
out for one or two regions, typically the United States (DICE/RICE,
MERGE and PAGE) or the United Kingdom (FUND). Most damage
functions used in IAMs have not been updated according to the
latest evidence on climate change, except for the PAGE model
used in the Stern Review, which takes into account new evidence
on more rapid warming and large-scale changes to the climate5 For a detailed survey of the literature on climate change impacts we refer to
Appendix 3 in Bosetti et al. (2009b).
V. Bosetti et al. / Energy Policy 55 (2013) 44–56 49system (‘‘system’’ surprise). As a consequence, previous modelling
exercises exhibit impacts, which on average, are quite small
compared with the results described in the Stern Review and in
estimates reported in the UNFCCC report (UNFCCC, 2007) and in
the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report (IPCC, 2007).
Two alternative damage scenarios are considered here: (i) a
low-damage scenario, embedded in the basic version of the
WITCH model, which in turn is based on the damage assessment
provided by Nordhaus and Boyer (2000); (ii) a high-damage
scenario, which incorporates more recent, higher damage esti-
mates in the range of Stern (2007) and UNFCCC (2007).
The WITCH model accounts for climate change damages, O, by
means of regional functions that describe a reduced-form quad-






In the low-damage scenario, for an increase in global tem-
perature below 3 1C, climate change impacts on GDP can be either
positive or negative, depending on regional vulnerability and
geographic location. Above that level, damages are negative
throughout the world and increase with a quadratic relationship
with temperature change. The resulting pattern of regional
damages in a Baseline As Usual scenario shows higher estimated
losses in developing countries, in particular South Asia (including
India) and Sub-Saharan Africa (Fig. 1). These two regions are
expected to lose the most from climate change, especially due to
higher damages in agriculture and the increase of vector-born
diseases (Sub-Saharan Africa) and because of catastrophic climate
impacts (South Asia including India). A recent review (Jamet and
Corfee-Morlot, 2009) also indicates Africa, South Asia, and South-
east Asia as the most vulnerable regions, with GDP losses reach-
ing more than 8% for a temperature increase above pre-industrial
levels between 2 and 2.5 1C. Damage estimates for agriculture,
coastal settlements, and catastrophic climate impacts are signiﬁ-
cant in Western Europe, resulting in higher damages than in other
developed regions. In China, Eastern EU countries, non-EU Eastern
European countries (including Russia), Japan–Korea, climate
change up to 2.5 1C would bring small beneﬁts, essentially
because of a reduction in energy demand for heating purposesFig. 1. Regional damage functions in the Business As Usual of the WITCH model.
Low damage and high discount rate cases.(non-EU Eastern European countries including Russia) or positive
effects on agricultural productivity (China).
In the higher-damage scenario, impacts become negative for
all countries when warming exceeds 1 1C. Global climate damages
are, by the end of the century approximately twice as large as in
the low-damage scenario.
Fig. 2 illustrates the time proﬁle of the two climate damage
scenarios comparing them to climate change damages that can be
extrapolated from the IPCC ranges reported in UNFCCC (2007).
The WITCH high-damage function follows UNFCCC data quite
closely until a 1.5 1C rise in global temperature, and increases
more severely beyond that, moving closer to – but remaining
lower than –Stern’s (2007) estimates.3.2. Discounting and pure rate of time preference
When analysing the inter-temporal effects of climate change
damages, the social discount rate and, in particular, the pure rate
of time preference plays a crucial role. There is a longstanding
controversy regarding the choice of the latter (Weitzman, 2001).
Consistent with a long line of economists (e.g. Ramsey, 1928;
Harrod, 1948; Solow, 1974), Stern (2007) argues on ethical
grounds for a near-zero value, while others dismiss this assump-
tion on the grounds that it is inconsistent with actual individual
behaviour (e.g. Nordhaus, 2007; Weitzman, 2007).
Aggregate discounted impacts are vastly increased if greater
weight is assigned to the far future, when damages are expected
to be higher. For example, Tol (2005) ﬁnds that the median value
of the social cost of carbon – an estimate of the marginal impact
caused by one additional ton of carbon – increases from 7 to 39
$US per ton of carbon when the pure rate of time preference
declines from 3% to 0%, i.e. when it declines from the value used in
Nordhaus’ DICE/RICE model to that used in the Stern Review.
This implies that cost-beneﬁt considerations would lead to a very
different abatement, depending on the value of the pure rate of time
preference. Indeed, in our subsequent analysis we show that only if
future damages are given enough weight, i.e. a 0.1% pure rate of
time preference is adopted, the grand coalition endogenously
achieves a stabilisation target that is in line with those discussed
in the policy debate, e.g. 550 ppm CO2-eq (see Section 4).
In order to take into account the existing debate on the choice
of the social discount rate, we perform our analyses under twoFig. 2. Global damage functions in the WITCH model.
Fig. 3. Discounted abatement costs for some representative WITCH regions under
a range of world carbon tax scenarios.
Fig. 4. Mitigation policy costs and free-riding incentives 1. The free-riding
incentive is computed as the difference in % between a region’s intertemporal
welfare if it withdraws from a world coalition of acting countries (the so-called
‘‘grand-coalition’’, see Section 3), and its intertemporal welfare if it participates in
the world coalition. A 0.1% annual pure rate of time preference is used to compute
the present value of welfare. 2. Cumulative consumption gap relative to BaU in
present value terms over 2015–2100, using a 3% annual discount rate.
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namely 3% and 0.1%.67 .In this analysis we assume cooperation is only on the climate externality.
The WITCH model incorporates other economic externalities related to the use of
natural resources and to the production and diffusion of knowledge and experi-3.3. Abatement costs
The incentives to participate in climate coalitions are also
shaped by mitigation policy costs. In WITCH, instead of aggre-
gated and static marginal abatement costs curves the model
traces the effects of moving towards more costly technologies,
of investing in R&D, of switching fuels and changing forest
management. In particular, countries differ in their demand for
energy, the cost of fuels, the distance from the technological
frontier in carbon-free technologies, as well as the potential for
renewable penetration.
Fig. 3 shows the discounted consumption loss of alternative
global carbon taxes for some representative regions of the WITCH
model. Some countries gain slightly for moderate taxes either
because of fuel switching or because of their comparative tech-
nological position. For higher carbon taxes, fossil fuel producers
such as the Middle East and non-EU Eastern European countries
(including Russia) are the biggest losers, reﬂecting their very high
energy/carbon intensity. Within the group of developed regions,
Western Europe would face smaller costs than the United States,
mainly reﬂecting their lower energy and carbon intensity. Energy
demand and large dependence on coal are the main drivers for
high costs in China. Latin American can beneﬁt from low costs
abatement options in the land use sector and this reduces
consumption losses vis a vis other developing countries.
The larger a region’s resulting mitigation costs, the smaller its
incentives to participate in a climate coalition, ceteris paribus.
One possible measure of free-riding incentives that is introduced
and discussed below is the difference (in %) between a region’s
welfare (deﬁned as the discounted sum of the logarithm of future
domestic per-capita consumption) if it free-rides on a world
coalition of acting countries, and its welfare if it participates in
that coalition. As Fig. 4 shows, there is clearly a positive relation-
ship between the indicator of free-riding incentives and the6 .Following Weitzman (2001), the pure rate of time preference is also
assumed to be time-declining from 3% in 2005 to 2.35% in 2100 in the high case
and from 0.1% to 0.08% in 2100.overall consumption loss induced by a given world carbon tax –
set here at $US100 per ton of CO2-eq. This is because climate
coalitions are assumed to implement an efﬁcient climate policy,
i.e. to equalise marginal abatement costs across all participating
regions. As a result, countries that face larger costs from a given
world carbon price can expect to gain less from joining an
international coalition, and therefore have larger incentives to
defect, ceteris paribus.4. Analysing coalition formation and stability
4.1. Cooperative versus non-cooperative outcomes
We start our analysis from the most environmental effective
coalition, namely the grand coalition. A world social planner
maximises the aggregate global welfare, which is deﬁned as the
weighted sum of regional welfares, using weights that ensure
equal marginal abatement costs worldwide. Later we see the
effect on coalitions of changing aggregating weights.7
We compare this optimal outcome with the non-cooperative
outcome where each of the 12 regions is assumed to choose the
optimal path of a set of choice variables (investments in physical
capital, in different energy technologies, in R&D, etc.) to maximise
its own social welfare function. In this framework, each region
takes its decisions individually, given the action of the other
players. The outcome of this non-cooperative game is an open-
loop Nash equilibrium.
Fig. 5 shows the implications of the two solution concepts for
global GHG emissions under the different assumptions about the
damage and discounting assumptions. In the non-cooperative
case, shown in the panel on the left, world emissions grow
throughout the century. Little abatement is undertaken with
respect to the case where climate damage is not anticipated andence. However, this paper analyses the incentive to form climate coalitions,
independently from linkages with other issues. In that context, it is assumed that
countries decide whether or not to cooperate only on the environmental
externality. Cooperation on technological externalities and on the use of natural
resources is not considered.
Fig. 5. All GHG emissions: Sensitivity to alternative damage and discount rate assumptions in the non- cooperative (left hand side panel) and cooperative (right hand side
panel) solutions.
Table 1
Analysis of the environmental achievements (GHG concentrations in 2100) of






None (Grand coalition) 507 546
Africa 518 603
Africa, Latin America 532 612
Africa, Non-EU Eastern Europe 531 603
Africa, Middle East and North Africa 529 609
Africa, South East Asia 526 598
Africa, South East Asia, Non-EU Eastern Europe 529 603
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of the century in the high- and low-discount cases, respectively.
Individual regions do not internalise the negative externality they
impose on the other regions and they only take into account the
domestic beneﬁts of their climate policy. As a consequence, late
century emissions are only slightly reduced to 100 and 105 Gton
CO2-eq, when damages are high and low, respectively. The choice
of the pure rate of time preference or of the damage scenario, in
this instance, does not make much of a difference. It must be
noted that lowering the discount rate has two opposing effects on
emissions. On the one hand, a lower discount rate induces lower
emissions because climate change negative impacts far in the
future are discounted less. On the other hand, a lower discount
rate increases the marginal beneﬁt of future consumption with
respect to present consumption and stimulates savings (and
investments), which lead to a higher BaU emission trajectory.
In other words, countries, which see far in the future, not only
invest more in environmental protection, but also in all other
sectors. With our model speciﬁcation we ﬁnd that the ‘‘economic
growth’’ effect of lower discounting is important and more than
compensates for the ‘‘environmental protection’’ effect in the
absence of cooperation, in the low damage case (see Fig. 5, panel
on the left).
If countries gather in a grand coalition, the environmental
externality is fully internalised and emissions decline drastically
(right hand side panel of Fig. 5). In addition, sensitivity to under-
lying assumptions is far greater than in the non-cooperative case.
Under these damage/discounting assumptions, the optimal emis-
sion path would be such to stabilise long-run GHG concentration
at about 546 ppm CO2-eq, when the pure rate of time preference
is 0.1%, and 672 ppm CO2-eq when it is 3%. This is equivalent to a
global mean temperature increase of 2.4 1C and 2.9 1C in 2100
with respect to the pre-industrial level.8 When looking at the
relative effect of lower discounting and of higher damages, the
former has a sizeable greater impact, in particular on short-term
emissions.
The difference between the cooperative and non-cooperative
outcomes gives an indication of the gains from cooperation,
which are substantial. The damage and discounting assumptions
affect the size of cooperation gains. A high discount rate reduces
the beneﬁts from cooperation, even more so when damages
are low.8 The model assumes a climate sensitivity equal to 3.4.2. Environmental effectiveness, proﬁtability and stability of
climate coalitions
With 12 regions the number of possible coalitions is very large
(4095 coalitions). However, we consider only a smaller number of
coalitions that are politically meaningful and have the potential to
generate emission reductions that lead to the 550 ppm CO2-eq
2100 atmospheric targets (approximately 2.4 1C increments in
global mean temperature with respect to the pre-industrial level).
A coalition is said to be politically meaningful if it includes at
least high-income countries (United States; European Union;
Japan and Korea; Australia, Canada and New Zealand). A coalition
is said to be potentially effective (PEC) if participating regions’
lower bound emission levels added to the BaU emissions of non-
participating countries yield a 550 ppm CO2-eq GHG concentra-
tion (or below) at the end of the century. More precisely, PECs are
identiﬁed by comparing, for each coalition structure, the path of
singletons’ BaU emissions and the world emission path required
to meet the target both in 2050 and 2100. This comparison is
repeated four times for each coalition structure, corresponding to
the four different non-cooperative baselines derived from alter-
native damage and discount rate assumptions.
The politically meaningful PECs at the end of the century are
listed in Table 1. These PECs include all industrialised countries
and both China and India. This is a ﬁrst important result. No
coalition is effective (i.e. can achieve the 550 ppm target) if it does
not include both China and India.
We perform a cost-beneﬁt analysis of each of these coalitions
under different assumptions on the pure rate of time preference,
Fig. 6. An illustration of free-riding incentives: the case of Africa. GHG emissions
in Sub-Saharan Africa.
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the environmental effectiveness of PECs and then look at their
proﬁtability and stability.
Among PECs, only the grand coalition is found to keep GHG
concentration below 550 ppm CO2-eq by 2100. This is illustrated
in Table 1, which shows the environmental performance of the
grand coalition, together with six other large coalitions that have
the technical potential to meet the target. The composition of
these coalitions suggests that large emitters such as China and
India should always be included. By contrast, Sub-Saharan Africa
is always excluded from these sub-coalitions as it is realistic to
assume that, if any other region stays out, then Sub-Saharan
Africa will necessarily follow, invoking equity arguments such as
the right to grow. Even if only Sub-Saharan Africa behaves as a
singleton, the 550 ppm CO2-eq target is exceeded in 2100. Leaving
an additional region out of the coalition raises GHG concentration
above the 600 ppm CO2-eq target.
Two main factors explain the failure of smaller coalitions to









subSmaller coalitions internalise only a fraction of the environ-
mental externality. The fraction of damage that is not inter-
nalised drives a gap between the coalition and the global
marginal beneﬁt of emission reduction. The larger this gap, the
smaller the emission cut that the coalition achieves. However,
there is not a clear relationship between coalition size, coali-
tion marginal damage, and emission reductions, because
damages are not evenly distributed among world regions. This
implies that the inclusion in the coalition of regions facing
larger damages from climate change increases coalition’s
marginal damage, and the optimal level of emission cuts,
ceteris paribus.2. As coalitions become less inclusive, the number of free-riders
obviously increases; these countries might simply keep emis-
sions unchanged, or even undertake some small abatement
due to the lower price of carbon-free technologies, but most
likely they increase emissions and undermine some of the
coalition’s emission reduction.
These two factors can be illustrated by looking at a coalition
structure under which only Sub-Saharan Africa does not partici-
pate and behaves as a singleton (Fig. 6). First, by leaving out Sub-
Saharan Africa, a large share of the global damage is not inter-
nalised (see Fig. 1, where South Asia and Sub-Saharan countries
would suffer the largest damage). As a consequence, such coali-
tion would achieve a lower abatement effort compared to the
grand coalition. The reaction of the other countries is a moderate
increase in emissions, at most about 6% (1.3 GtCO2-eq).Second,
and more important, the emissions of Sub-Saharan Africa itself
dramatically increase when it behaves as a singleton. The global
increase in emissions is thus mostly due to the behaviour of Sub-
Saharan African countries, which more than double emissions by
the end of the century.
It is worth noting that, although the emissions of the Sub-
Saharan African region are larger than what they would be in the9 In what follows, we only report results for the high damage scenario which
most conducive to signiﬁcant emission reductions. If a coalition is not
ironmentally effective in this case, it cannot be effective under lower damages.
10 One assumption is crucial here and may alter these results: the absence of
ative emissions technologies, or any other technology that might alter the
ate (i.e. geo-engineering). If one assumed that by means of bio-energy and
bon capture and sequestration, or direct CO2 capture, or other technologies that
r the incoming solar radiation, cooperating countries could dramatically
nge the climate, than the requirements on the dimension and composition of
alition to endogenously produce the 550 ppm CO2-eq by 2100 target could be
stantially different.grand coalition, they are still lower than in the non-cooperative
scenario. Although Sub-Saharan Africa could emit as much as in
the non-cooperative scenario or even more, it is not optimal for
these countries to do it. The reason is the presence of interna-
tional technology transfers from coalition members that reduce
the costs of carbon-free technologies outside the coalition itself,
thus inducing some emission reductions in the Sub-Saharan
African region as well.11
An important factor in shaping the effectiveness of the coali-
tion is the weight given to future damages (i.e. the pure rate of
time preference). A higher rate implies, for the grand coalition, an
addition of GHG concentration in the atmosphere equal to
125 ppm CO2-eq compared to the low discounting case (approxi-
mately equivalent to an additional warming of 0.5 1C). Smaller
coalitions, already reaching more than 600 ppm CO2-eq with a
low discount rate, would lead to an increase of 80 ppm CO2-eq
or more.
Finally, the coalition effectiveness is obviously affected by the
weights used to aggregate different regions when maximising
aggregate welfare. The results discussed so far are based on
normative weights equal to the inverse of marginal utility, which
imply a cost-efﬁcient allocation of abatement within the coalition.
Table 2 illustrates the grand coalition and compares the solution
based on normative weights with that based on a weighting
scheme more favourable to developing countries, e.g. propor-
tional to the population share. This aggregation scheme increases
the environmental effectiveness of the coalition in the short and
medium term, and also in the long term with a sufﬁciently high
discount rate. However, with a low discount rate the population
social welfare aggregator yields higher GHG emissions concentra-
tions in 2100.
International climate coalitions need not only to be environ-
mentally effective, but should also be self-enforcing. In other
words, a coalition should be proﬁtable and stable, or at least
potentially stable. As noted in Section 2, a coalition is proﬁtable if
each cooperating player achieves a welfare larger than in the non-
cooperative scenario. A coalition is internally stable if the welfare
of each participating region is larger or equal to the welfare it
would obtain from staying out of the coalition thus free riding on
coalition members’ abatement efforts. As an example, when11 Depending on the stringency of the target and the characteristic of the free-
riding countries either the energy market or the innovation effect may prevail, see
Bosetti and De Cian (2011) for a throughout discussion of these competing effects.
Table 2
Analysis of the environmental achievements of potentially effective coalitions, cost-beneﬁt mode, high-damage/low and high discounting using different weights.
Overall GHG concentration (ppm CO2-eq)
2030 2050 2100
Normative weight (equal to the inverse of marginal utility) – 0.1% PRTP 480 507 546
Population weight (equal to the inverse of marginal utility) – 0.1% PRTP 473 502 556
Normative weight (equal to the inverse of marginal utility) – 3% PRTP 506 574 672
Population weight (equal to the inverse of marginal utility) – 3% PRTP 489 538 622
Table 3
Proﬁtability, stability and strong potential internal stability of potentially effective coalitions.




Low PRTP (0.1%) – Normative Weighted
None (Grand coalition) NO (Africa, China) NOT STAB (all) NOT PIS 546
Africa NO (China) NOT STAB (All) NOT PIS 603
Africa, Latin America NO (China) NOT STAB (All) PIS 612
Africa, Non-EU Eastern Europe NO (China) NOT STAB (all) PIS 603
Africa, Middle East and North Africa NO (China) NOT STAB (all) PIS 609
Africa, South East Asia NO (China) NOT STAB (all) PIS 598
Africa, South East Asia, Non-EU Eastern Europe NO (China) NOT STAB (all) PIS 603
High PRTP (3%) – normative weights
None (Grand coalition) YES NOT STAB (all but China
and Latin America)
PIS 672
Low PRTP (0.1%) – Population Weighted





In parenthesis countries for which coalitions are not proﬁtable or internally stable.
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simulations in which any of the 12 regions is assumed to deviate,
while the others continue to cooperate. Let us recall that,
although not stable, a coalition might be Potentially Internally
Stable (PIS) if there is a transfer scheme that gives each member
at least its free-riding pay-off and shares the remaining surplus
(McGinty, 2007).
Table 3 reports proﬁtability, internal and potential internal
stability for different coalitions. As expected, all large coalitions
considered in the analysis are not proﬁtable, as there is always at
least one region, namely China and/or Sub-Saharan Africa, which
is worse off than in the non-cooperative case.
The second column from the right in Table 3 reports results on
whether a coalition can be stabilised through a set of transfers ~M,
i.e. whether the coalition is strongly PIS. By aggregating Eq. (6)






0 8 ~mA ~M , we test if PiAgPtCi,tðgÞRi,tZPiAgPtCi,t g\i Ri,t .
First, the grand coalition is not strongly PIS. The aggregate,
discounted surplus from cooperation is equal to 477 USD trillions
over the 2005–2100 time horizon, while the sum of the gains from
free-riding is equal to 680 USD trillions. What about the coalition
that includes all regions but Africa, i.e. the most environmental
effective of all partial coalitions? Table 3 shows that this coalition is
not potentially internally stable, but the gap is now only 2% of the
aggregate discounted consumption gain of the coalition.
The smaller PECs are strongly PIS. Therefore, the lowest level of
GHG concentration that can be achieved by a stable coalition is
slightly above 518 ppm CO2-eq in 2050 and around 600 ppm CO2-eq
in 2100 (see Table 3 again).
To provide greater insight on internal stability, and how this
interplays with crucial assumptions on the aggregation anddiscounting assumptions, Fig. 7 reports free-riding incentives
across regions, e.g. the difference in consumption between free
riding regions and regions participating in the grand coalition.
Let us start by looking at the light grey bars, which refer to the
central case of 0.1% discounting and normative weights. The
Middle East–North Africa region, China, the rest of Africa, and
non-EU Eastern European countries are estimated to have the
largest incentive to free ride. By contrast, developed countries
have the lowest free-riding incentives, with the exception of the
Australia–Canada–New Zealand region.
When the pure rate of time preference used in the analysis is
3% instead of 0.1% (see second row in Table 3) each region’s
welfare in the grand coalition is larger than in the non-
cooperative case. Therefore, the grand coalition is proﬁtable.
In addition, the incentives to free ride are now much smaller,
although the coalition is neither stable nor internally stable. We
ﬁnd that the discounted surplus, in consumption terms, generated
by cooperation (133 USD trillions) is four times greater than the
discounted aggregate surplus from free-riding (35 USD trillions).
This result conﬁrms a well-established conclusion of coalition
theory. When gains from cooperation are large, as in the 0.1%
case, free-riding incentives are also likely to be high. On the
contrary, when gains from cooperation are small, as in the 3%
case, free-riding incentives are reduced signiﬁcantly. In Fig. 7, the
black bars reiterate this conclusion by showing the incentive to
free ride when the discount rate is higher. A clear message
emerges from our analysis: cooperation is indeed possible, proﬁt-
able, and potentially stable, only if the environmental target is
moderate (at least compared to what currently discussed in the
policy debate), i.e. around 600 ppm CO2-eq by 2100.
Finally, we test whether a different set of aggregation weights
affects the results (see the last row in Table 3). When using
Fig. 7. Estimated ranking of free-riding incentives across regions % Difference in
consumption between free-riding on and participating in the grand coalition.
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for Africa, South Asia, and South-East Asia and it is not internally
stable (only Africa sees welfare gains from cooperation that
compensate incentives to deviate). Fig. 7 (upward diagonal bars)
shows that when population weights are used, the regional
pattern of free-riding incentives is reversed with respect to the
cost-effective abatement allocation. First, with population
weights the abatement allocation is no longer efﬁcient, as it does
not equalise marginal abatement costs across regions. In addition,
perceiving a larger damage, the grand coalition abates more. The
effort is shared across all members, which all abate more
compared to the normative aggregation, with the exception of
Africa, South Asia, and South-East Asia. These regions have two
characteristics. First, due to their high population they receive the
largest weights in the social welfare function, together with
China. Second, they have the largest beneﬁts from cooperation,
and in fact, cooperation becomes proﬁtable for them. These
characteristics lead to a high beneﬁt-cost ratio, which explains
their very low free riding incentives.5. Conclusions
The Durban Action Platform has resuscitated the hope that an
international climate policy agreement might be signed in the
next few years. By replacing the long standing divide between
Annex 1 and non Annex 1 countries, it has opened up a new
negotiation phase in which new coalitions of major emitters
could be formed. This policy advancement calls for new explora-
tions of which coalitions can and should emerge from the next
negotiation rounds. The integrated assessment modelling com-
munity, which plays an inﬂuential role in the IPCC process, has
mostly focused on the analysis of the effectiveness of coalitions
(mostly the grand coalition) in attaining climate stabilisation.
Considerably less attention has been devoted to the assessment of
the conditions under which such coalitions would form in the ﬁrst
place, and whether they would be able to stick together for a
sufﬁciently long period. Given the policy relevance of this ques-
tion, more research should be devoted to this issue.
This paper contributes to this debate by analysing the incen-
tives and the stability of international climate coalitions using the
integrated assessment model WITCH. The nature of the model
allows us to provide a richer and more exhaustive description of
the many forces at play than currently done in the literature,including multiple externalities (related climate change, techno-
logical innovation and fuel prices), investments in mitigation
technologies and knowledge, and regional climate damages.
The WITCH model has been used to perform an analysis of
coalitions’ proﬁtability and stability under alternative combina-
tions of climate damage and social time rate of preference, and
assessed the effect of two different schemes for aggregating
welfare across countries. As expected, the scenario with high
climate damages and low discount rate is shown to be the most
conducive to cooperation for emissions control as it increases the
size of the expected present value of climate change damages. The
weighting scheme proportional to population size also increases
the effort of the coalition by giving greater weight to developing
countries, where most of climate damages are projected to occur.
Our cost-beneﬁt analysis suggests that only the grand coalition
ﬁnds it optimal as a whole to stabilise total GHG concentration
below 550 ppm CO2-eq (in the high-damage/low-discounting
case). Smaller coalitions, including the grand coalition excluding
Africa only, achieve somewhat less ambitious targets, above
600 ppm CO2-eq. This is because they do not fully internalise
the global environmental externality and allow a larger number of
(non-participating) countries to free ride.
Although the grand coalition as a whole has an incentive to
achieve the 550 ppm CO2-eq target, it is not internally stable.
Most regions gain more from non-participation than from parti-
cipation to the grand coalition. This is also true for smaller
coalitions. The grand coalition is not even strongly potentially
internally stable (PIS) – i.e. there is not a set of international
monetary transfers that would make discounted consumption at
least as high as when free-riding, for all coalition members. This is
because the overall welfare gain from the grand coalition relative
to the non-cooperative outcome is not large enough to give each
country its free-riding pay off. After compensating all losers in the
coalition, the remaining coalition surplus is too small to offset
free-riding incentives in pure consumption terms.
The coalition that includes all regions except Africa is also not
strongly PIS, but discounted consumption after the redistribution
of cooperation gains is only 2% lower than discounted consump-
tion when regions do not cooperate. All other coalitions that are
able to stabilize GHG concentrations to about 600 ppm CO2-eq in
2100 are instead strongly PIS.
Although not strongly PIS, the grand-coalition and the coali-
tion composed by all regions but Africa could be weakly PIS – i.e.
discounted utility, rather than per capita consumption, with the
self-ﬁnanced transfer scheme is higher than discounted utility
when free-riding, for all coalition members. Weakly PIS coalitions
might in fact exploit international and intertemporal differences
in the marginal utility of consumption of coalition members to
devise a transfer scheme that neutralizes free-riding incentives.
Lower transfers of consumption would be necessary to compen-
sate losses of welfare due to cooperation and the set of PIS
coalitions might be larger. With transfer schemes less strict than
those examined in this paper it might be possible to attain a level
of GHG concentrations lower than 600 ppm CO2-eq in 2100.
Therefore, there is certainly space for further research in this area.
Nonetheless, a clear message emerges from our analysis: coop-
eration is possible and proﬁtable, but it is unlikely to ensure the
stabilization of GHG concentrations at levels consistent with the 2 1C
threshold. It is nonetheless possible to attain an intermediate
stabilisation objective (such as 600 ppm CO2-eq), provided substan-
tial ﬁnancial transfers across regions are implemented.
Our ﬁndings are subject to a number of limitations. Even
though extensive sensitivity analysis has been carried out to
assess the robustness of the main results, it should be acknowl-
edged that our model-based analysis relies on strong assump-
tions. In particular, there are wide uncertainties surrounding
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from climate change, the likelihood and effect of catastrophic
risks, and the cross-country distribution of these damages
and risks.
Furthermore, the analysis focuses on immediate, irreversible
and self-enforcing participation to mitigation action, thereby
abstracting from other possible bargaining options including e.g.
delayed participation, renegotiation, sanctions or joint negotia-
tion in multiple areas (e.g. linking climate and international trade
negotiations). For instance, a major emitting country may have
greater participation incentives than found here if it expects its
withdrawal to prevent the formation of any coalition. The use of
the internal–external stability concept might thus be somewhat
too restrictive when dealing with large and inﬂuential regions.
The co-beneﬁts from mitigation action, e.g. in terms of human
health, energy security or biodiversity, are also not taken into
account. Other studies suggest that such co-beneﬁts are large,
although the participation incentives they provide are dampened
by the fact that some of these co-beneﬁts could be reaped through
direct policy action – in particular, local air pollution might be
reduced at a lower cost through direct policy action than through
reductions in GHG emissions (Bollen et al., 2009; Burniaux et al.,
2008). Removal of fossil fuel subsidies, one of the few policies to
yield potentially both climate and economic beneﬁts, is also
omitted from the analysis. Insofar as phasing out subsidies would
bring an economic gain and lower the carbon intensity of a
number of (mainly developing) countries, incentives to partici-
pate in international mitigation action could improve.
Another potential limitation of the analysis is to assume that
even if a country beneﬁts from an international coalition relative
to a BaU scenario, it will always prefer to free-ride if that option is
even more proﬁtable. While this assumption merely derives from
individual welfare maximisation, current international redistri-
butive policies such as ofﬁcial development aid point instead to
some degree of altruism. Against this background, there might be
a possibility for some countries to sign an agreement even if they
could in principle gain more from free-riding on other countries’
abatement efforts. We test this possibility by computing the cost
for developed countries of using additional resources (additional
to the coalition surplus) to stabilise the grand coalition, i.e. to give
each other region its free-riding pay off. These calculations show
that with a 3% loss in the discounted value of their consumption
levels, industrialised countries could stabilise the grand coalition
in the high-damage/low-discounting case, i.e. all other participat-
ing regions could be fully compensated for their free-riding
incentives through ﬁnancial transfers, thereby bringing them into
an agreement.
Finally, two crucial assumptions affect the results presented in
the paper: the absence of negative emissions technologies or any
other technology that might alter the climate (i.e. geo-engineer-
ing), and the absence of adaptation policies.
If cooperating countries could unilaterally change the climate
by using bioenergy with carbon capture and sequestration, direct
CO2 capture, or other technologies that alter the incoming solar
radiation, then the requirements on the dimension and composi-
tion of a coalition to endogenously produce the 550 ppm CO2-eq
by 2100 target could be substantially different. Adaptation poli-
cies, by providing beneﬁts that are local, at least within the
boundary of macro-regions considered in this model, could also
change free-riding incentives and thus the willingness to12 . For instance, projected world BaU emission growth is somewhat higher in
WITCH than in the OECD model ENV-Linkages as featured in Burniaux et al. (2008)
(100% versus 85% over the period 2005-50).cooperate on climate change mitigation. These topics are left for
future research.References
Asheim, G., Froyn, C.B., Hovi, J., Menz, F.C., 2006. Regional versus global coopera-
tion on climate control. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
51, 93–109.
Barrett, S., 1994. Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements. Oxford
Economic Papers 46 pp. 878–894.
Bollen, J., Guay, B., Jamet, S. and Corfee-Morlot, J., 2009. Co-beneﬁts of Climate
change Mitigation Policies: Literature Review and New Results, OECD Eco-
nomics Department Working Papers, No. 692, OECD, Paris.
Bosello, F., B. Buchner, Carraro, C., 2003. Equity, development, and climate change
control, Journal of the European Economic Association 1, 601–611.
Bosetti, V., Carraro, C., Galeotti, M., Massetti, E., Tavoni, M., 2006. WITCH: a world
induced technical change hybrid model. The Energy Journal, Special Issue.
Hybrid Modeling of Energy-Environment Policies: Reconciling Bottom-up and
Top-down, 13–38.
Bosetti, V., Carraro, C., Massetti, E., Tavoni, M., 2008. International technology
spillovers and the economics of greenhouse gas atmospheric stabilization.
Energy Economics 30 (6), 2912–2929.
Bosetti, V., Carraro, C., Duval, R., De Cian, E., Massetti, E. and M..Tavoni, 2009. The
Incentives to Participate in and the Stability of International Climate Coali-
tions: a Game Theoretic Approach Using the WITCH Model, OECD Economics
Department Working Papers No. 702, June 2009.
Bosetti, V., Massetti, E. and Tavoni, M., 2007. The WITCH Model. Structure,
Baseline, Solutions, FondazioneEni Enrico Mattei Working Paper No. 10.2007.
Burniaux, J.-M., Chateau, J., Duval, R. and Jamet, S., 2008. The Economics of Climate
Change Mitigation: Policies and Options for the Future, OECD Economics
Department Working Papers, No. 658, OECD, Paris.
Bre´chet, T., Eyckmans, J., Ge´rard, F., Marbaix, P., Tulkens, H., van Ypersele, J.P.,
2010. The impact of the EUs carbon emissions reduction proposals on the
stability of global climate agreements. Climate Policy 10, 148–166.
Bre´chet, T., F., Gerard, and H., Tulkens, 2011. Efﬁciency vs. Stability in climate
coalitions: a conceptual and computational appraisal, The Energy Journal 32
(1), 49–76.
Carraro, C., Siniscalco, D., 1993. Strategies for the international protection of the
environment. Journal of Public Economics 52, 309–328.
Carraro, C., Siniscalco, D., 1991. Transfers and Commitments in International
Negotiations, Paper prepared for the ESF Task Force 3 on Environmental
Economics. In: Maler, K.G. (Ed.), International Environmental Problems: An
Economic Perspective. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht.
Chander, P. and H. Tulkens, 1997. The core of an economy with multilateral
environmental externalities. International Journal of Game Theory 26.
Carraro, C. and J. Eyckmans and M. Finus, 2006. Optimal transfers and participa-
tion decisions in international environmental agreements. The Review of
International Organizations 1.
d’Aspremont, C.A., Gabszewicz, J.J., 1986. On the stability of collusion. In:
Matthewson, G.F., Stiglitz, J.E. (Eds.), New Developments in the Analysis of
Market Structure. Macmillan, New York.
d’Aspremont,C.A., A. Jaquemin, J.J. Gabszewicz and J. Weymark, 1983. On the
stability of collusive price leadership. Canadian Journal of Economics 16.
Donsimoni, M.P., Economides, N.S., Polemarchakis, H.M., 1986. Stable cartels.
International Economic Review 27, 317–327.
Hanemann, W.M., 2008. What is the Cost of Climate Change?, CUDARE Working
Paper No. 1027, University of California, Berkeley.
Harrod, R., 1948. Towards a Dynamic Economics: Some Recent Developments of
Economic Theory and Their Application to Policy. MacMillan, London.
IEA, 2004. World Energy Outlook 2004. OECD, IEA Paris.
IPCC, 2007. Climate change 2007: impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. In: Parry,
M., Canziani, O., Palutikof, J., van der Linden, P., Hanson, C. (Eds.), Contribution
of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report on Climate Change.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Jamet, S., Corfee-Morlot, J., 2009. Assessing the Impacts of Climate Change: a
Literature Review of the Impacts of Climate Change, OECD Economics Depart-
ment Working Papers, No. 691, ECD, Paris.
McGinty, M., 2007. International environmental agreements among asymmetric
nations. Oxford Economic Papers 59, 45–62.
Nagashima, M., Dellink, R., van Ierland, E., Weikard, H.P., 2009. Stability of
international climate coalition – a comparison of transfer schemes. Ecological
Economics 68, 1476–1478.
Nordhaus, W., 2007. A review of the stern review on the economics of climate
change. Journal of Economic Literature 45 (3).
Nordhaus, W.D., Boyer, J.G., 2000. Warming the World: the Economics of the
Greenhouse Effect. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Ramsey, F., 1928. A mathematical theory of saving. Economic Journal 38 (152).
Solow, R.M., 1974. The economics of resources or the resources of economics.
American Economic Review 64 (2).
Stern, N., 2007. The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
Tol, R.S.J., 2005. The marginal damage costs of carbon dioxide emissions: an
assessment of uncertainties. Energy Policy. (33).
V. Bosetti et al. / Energy Policy 55 (2013) 44–5656UNFCCC, 2007. Investments and Financial Flows to Address Climate Change,
Background Paper on Analysis of Existing and Planned Investments and
Financial Flows Relevant to the Development of Effective and Appropriate
International Response to Climate Change.Weitzman, M., 2007. A review of the stern review on the economics of climate
change. Journal of Economic Literature 45 (3).
Weitzman, M., 2001. Gamma discounting. American Economic Review 91 (1).
